On Aids For Directing Judgment
The Literary Polyhistor: Book 2, Ch. 4
Elder’s Notes
A few notes for readers: older Latin textbooks sometimes used janua, meaning “door” or “gate,” for a class of introductory textbooks. Two texts mentioned in this chapter use that “gate” convention: Comenius’ Janua Linguarum Reserata (The Gate of Languages Unlocked) and William Bathe’s Janua Linguarum (The Gate of Languages).
Verulam refers to Francis Bacon.
Table of Content
In directing judgment, the chief concern must be devoted to study.
The inventive art of arts, and the principles of examination or judgment, are deduced from logic.
Children in their earliest age should be imbued with an orderly knowledge of things.
Authors who have written on polymathy are unsuitable for this purpose.
How a school of nature, art, and human actions should be established.
Such a theater would be of great use if built at a prince’s expense.
1. Judgment and memory are the chief parts of talent.
The two chief parts of talent, so to speak, are judgment and memory. Memory is usually valued highly, and not undeservedly, because its use is very great in every discipline. In the individual disciplines there are so many rules, and so many different things to be grasped by memory, that without them nothing at all can be accomplished.
2. The very great necessity and usefulness of memory.
The philosopher must keep in mind the whole nature of things, the nomenclature and rules of so many bodies and so many arts. The theologian must retain the books of the Old and New Testaments and the decrees of the Fathers. The jurist must have ready the laws and responses of the ancient prudent men. The physician must keep at hand the names of herbs, diseases, and medicines.
3. Yet memory without judgment is lame and mutilated.
I admit that all these things are many and great; but unless a remarkable power of judgment accompanies them, they will be of no use to any human being. First, then, memory must be furnished with various rules in every discipline; but if we are to transfer it to use, there is need of judgment.
4. Judgment lays its hand upon all disciplines.
As long as we learn statutes and laws in the schools, the matter belongs to memory; in the forum and in actual use, judgment is added. Many people know the names of diseases and medicines accurately enough through the help of memory; only after judgment has been trained by many years and cases do they become physicians.
5. In directing judgment, the chief concern must be devoted to study.
Therefore the chief study must be applied to directing judgment, and we must see what aids can be called upon to strengthen it.
6. Logic supplies aids for directing judgment.
Let us survey that whole circle of philosophy, and we will find there a discipline that brings reason itself into order, called by the name logic or dialectic. If, then, it is true that this discipline is concerned with the things that belong to reason, it must include that principal part of reason which consists in judgment, and it must fashion instruments suited to every kind of science. Therefore it is rightly called the organ and instrument of science, and this discipline must be cultivated with as much care as possible, not lightly or superficially.
7. Many people pay too little attention to its use.
But if the truth must be said, most people are involved in these studies in such a way that they care little for the ends for which they were devised. For they are satisfied with the highest classes of things and notions and with the thin artifice of syllogisms, and they are hardly concerned about use itself, as though:
If someone buys lyres, let him pile the bought ones into one place,
Though no study of the lyre, no Muse, has been granted him.
8. Its use extends more widely than is commonly believed.
Since the whole discipline belongs to use, and for that reason is called an instrument, its use is far greater and spreads much more widely than many suppose. Therefore, in contemplating this instrument, it would be extremely foolish unless we also applied it to the things to which it can and should be applied.
9. Logic is the key to the remaining sciences.
When many saw this use, and noticed that it was commonly neglected by philosophers, some devised particular inventive and combinatory arts. In these attempts they should by no means be blamed, except insofar as they wished to separate from the discipline of logic inventions that flow uniquely from that very source. Verulam rightly says in On the Advancement of Learning, book 5, chapter 1:
“The rational sciences are the keys of all the rest. And just as the hand is the instrument of instruments and the soul the form of forms, so these arts should be considered the arts of arts. They do not only direct; they also strengthen, just as the use and habit of shooting does not only make a person aim better, but also draw the bow more strongly.”
10. Verulam makes four arts subordinate to logic.
Verulam makes four logical arts, divided by the ends toward which they aim. For in the rational arts a person acts either to find what he is seeking, to judge what he has found, to retain what he has judged, or to communicate what he has retained. He therefore establishes the same number of arts: the art of inquiry or invention, the art of examination or judgment, the art of custody or memory, and the art of expression or transmission.
11. The latter flow from the former.
But the latter arts in some way proceed as consequences from the former, insofar as inquiry and judgment contribute to memory. For memory can have many things in itself, and can be cultivated without these aids; and expression, although contained by certain rules of its own, must nevertheless be referred to logic, insofar as well-ordered concepts serve the form of arguments, arrangement, and the actual words.
12. Didactics also must be added to them.
To these we must add didactics, an offshoot of the doctrine of method, which must be considered in its own peculiar way and according to its own principles.
13. The inventive art of arts, and the principles of examination or judgment, are deduced from logic.
Among these arts, which Verulam calls rational, the inventive art, insofar as it is referred to art, he says should be desired:
“Invention is twofold: one invention of arts and sciences, the other of arguments and speeches.”
He says that he will deal with this second kind and that the first has been cultivated by no one.
14. This has so far been partly neglected.
I do not deny this, but I do not know by what fate the studies of those who discussed these matters did not occur to him, and not a few of them were even barbarians in that age, among whom thoughts like those proposed by Verulam did arise. And surely anyone can see that the same principles of dialectic can lead to the formation of such conclusions.
15. A general rule for finding and reasoning is handed down.
Next, the art of judgment and direction, or examination, which deals with the nature of experiments, flows from the same principles. For although Verulam sets out certain special ways in which such an examination can be established, all of them can nevertheless be drawn from the doctrine of causes and from dialectical topics, since the particular topics, or articles of inquiry as he calls them, show this well enough. In all those experimental discoveries there lies hidden a certain method of argument, drawn from some one of the dialectical topics; but we cannot now deal with this more fully.
In meditation, invention, and every act of reasoning, the general rule is the one that Spinoza set down in his treatise On the Correction of the Intellect: that we should rightly gather the differences, agreements, and oppositions of things, form clear and distinct ideas of them, and from their progress, which expands from small principles to greater axioms and conclusions, deduce whatever agrees with our argument.
16. Children in their earliest age should be imbued with an orderly knowledge of things.
Therefore those who judge that children should be well imbued from their earliest age with an orderly knowledge of things do well, so that ideas of the whole universe of things may present themselves to their minds.
17. Boecler expressed this view on the matter.
Among others, the very distinguished Boecler especially held this view in a manuscript dissertation On Studies, which came into my hands through the kindness of a friend, but was imperfect and was left unfinished by the death of that distinguished man. He says:
“We would now advise that, when the common and first letters have been learned, effort should be made so that minds may have the very universe of things known and set before them in a clear view, in the way this can most conveniently be done. On this plan, we see that everyone can easily agree and meet, even if they do not set out on one road. It is indeed to be regretted that down to this day there is no little book suited to this purpose. Several learned men have tried to present the matter through dialogues; but since other uses are not denied to them, they have not yet served this particular end. The thing is better understood in itself: in books in which the universe of things is being sought, the account of words and language should be treated as other matters are, for example, in Latin, only Latin words and words possessing authority should be used, and the same should be done in other languages.”
18. Bateus’ Gate.
These are Boecler’s words. On that occasion he inserts his judgment on Comenius’ Gate, and in its place recommends Bateus’ Gate, enlarged over twelve centuries.
19. Comenius’ Gate is not rightly used for training the young.
As for Comenius’ Gate, it should plainly be removed from those schools where, as is proper, attention is paid to genuine Latinity. For although some knowledge of things can be obtained from it, that knowledge is slight and not arranged in a sufficiently suitable order for the purpose chiefly proposed in the work; and it is everywhere scattered with barbarous words and phrases that can corrupt the good Latin of the young. Whatever Comenius may also assert in the Apology written for the Latinity of his Gate, the Gate itself needs another apology.
20. Children should be led early to a knowledge of periods.
And why should I now say that books of this kind plainly cannot be commended for Latinity, since they are presented through mere axioms in which there is no periodic connection of their particles, though boys ought to grow accustomed to that early? On this point Sturm’s plan is sound: he collected sentences from the authors according to the order and number of periods; once a boy had read and learned them, he would have the idea of number and succession in his mind, which later would be of great help in writing at length. Such a plan was taken from the ancient authors, who had a more elegant placement of words and a more exact judgment of the ear.
21. Scioppius’ Bilingual Mercury.
Scioppius also produced a Bilingual Mercury, whose method he discusses more fully in the preface to his Grammar and Mercury.
22. The School of Latinity published at Gotha.
Boecler, too, seems to have recommended for this purpose the School of Latinity published at Gotha, which, as he says:
“Embraces the universe of things with a certain judicious selection and context.”
23.Boecler’s wish.
But he still desires fuller and more exact work, and recommends that such a work be made out of Ciceronian cento-texts. He perhaps did not recall that Freigius had in some measure done this in his Ciceronianus.
24.Authors who have written on polymathy are unsuitable for this purpose.
But Garzoni’s book, titled The Universal Piazza, which has been translated from Italian into German, and other miscellaneous writers, such as Alexander ab Alexandro and Caelius Rhodiginus, should not be referred to these uses; nor should Polydore Vergil’s book On the Inventors of Things, which Lambecius rightly criticized.
25.Mechovius’ proposal.
Mechovius also complains in his Hermathene, treatise 3, chapter 4, about the defective instruction in the knowledge of things:
“I do not know whether here we should ask from the young a little book on the nature of things, in which something about the world, heaven, the elements, and other things, enough for this age, would be woven together from the best writers, so that one would not spend one’s time in one’s own country like a guest and stranger. This has often been in my mind, to consult my polymathic friends; but the hour rushed by, and time slips away even from the unwary.”
From this I would conjecture that this very learned man had in mind some such small work as Boecler advised should be composed from centos of the old writers, and such as he gave in his Parenesis, his ethical specimen, with excellent judgment.
26. Mylius’ History of the University.
Nor did Christopher Mylius occur to Boecler, although he published a History of the University in no contemptible order and with no contemptible labor.
27. A general arrangement of things.
But all these things are undertaken with greater apparatus than is necessary at that age. That general arrangement of things, through words and phrases suited to the topic to be defined, is enough; a learned teacher can supply the rest by teaching.
28. Comenius’ pictured world of sensible things.
With this design, Comenius, although not sufficiently refined in Latinity, was by no means lacking in didactic prudence, as appears from the various volumes he composed, and he published his Pictured World of Sensible Things, as the very inscription reads, in four languages. This work should by no means be despised, for in it the thing itself is presented to the eyes through images, and the words and expressions belonging to it are learned at the same time.
29. Certain things are lacking in it.
But I would prefer such a little book to be illustrated with more elegant pictures, and everything to be placed before the eyes in a cleaner and more exact order. Order is especially to be observed here: all connected, related, and contrary things should be placed under the same series, so that they may be impressed together on memory. In this way the sources from which arguments may either be found or judgments enlarged will cling to the mind at the same time, and this will be like a universal instrument for an abundance of things and words.
30. Passages from Sturm and Johann Benz.
Sturm once had this in mind, and after him his disciple Johann Benz, who arranged the whole of Latinity in seventy-six topics. According to this order boys first impressed words on memory; older students set up collections of phrases, as Johann Benz shows in special books for Latin and Greek. Sentences and theses too, whether political or ethical, could be gathered under titles ordered in the same way. Thus anyone who entered on this path would be trained for every exercise of speaking and discussing. For nothing disturbs method more than variety, and constancy makes all things put down firmer roots.
31. H. Weitz’s Royal Road to the Latin Language.
H. Weitz also looked to this point, publishing in Copenhagen in 1661 a few sheets titled A Royal Road to the Latin Language. In chapter 1 he deals with things, which he divides according to their classes in a fairly good order. Chapter 2 deals with the modes of things, bringing into order everything that belongs to the classes of quality, relations, and so on. Chapter 3 treats the motions of things, where he examines their actions, passions, and durations. Chapter 4 treats human actions according to certain objects, different states, and varied circumstances. Chapter 5 treats the modes of motions, actions, and passions. Chapter 6 treats the circumstances of a thing’s motion or rest. Chapter 7 treats the coherence of things and actions. Chapter 8 treats the multiplication of things and words. In this way, under about five hundred general headings, he arranged in a not inelegant order the whole series of words under which things and actions are contained. These headings could be used by those who are either meditating on something, collecting phraseology, or establishing similar exercises.
32. Johann Joachim Becher’s New Organon is praised.
Johann Joachim Becher proposed a similar plan in his New Organon for Quickly Acquiring an Abundance of Words on Any Subject, now published in Latin and German. In it, part 1 contains the actions and passions of things, or verbs; part 2 contains the predicates and qualities of things, or adjectives; part 3 contains the circumstances and modes of actions and qualities, or adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections; part 4 has the subjects of speech, or substances. He arranges the several parts under fifteen general physical headings for the most general combination of their parts: 1. Substance. 2. Quality. 3. Quantity. 4. Place. 5. Time. 6. Taste. 7. Smell. 8. Sight. 9. Hearing. 10. Touch. 11. Power of acting. 12. Will. 13. Reason. 14. Virtue and vice. 15. Theological matters and miscellaneous qualities.
33. Its use in invention and meditation.
He subdivides each heading again, and in this way constructs a complete system of all words occurring in a language, ordered by a certain philosophical method. This can serve not only an abundance of words, but also meditation and the invention of things. For invention is nothing other than joining, as we meditate, what agrees with the matter, and separating what conflicts with it. Whoever has become sufficiently accustomed here to analogies in disconnected words will easily link, by the work of the intellect and by reasoning, the things that can be predicated of themselves in simple, pointed, or enthymematic speech.
And surely what the author himself proclaims in the preface to this Organon is not altogether empty:
“So that you may know the secondary use of this Organon, which is in truth primary and could itself be called the organ, namely that it is the mind itself, and in comparison, as by an invisible articulation and sequence, it leads you to the third connection, which likewise has a place in all structures of things and human thoughts, and from whose true, clear, and distinct understanding the whole light of human wisdom arises.”
34.Becher’s Didactic Method.
Becher had proposed to aid the education of youth with three books, and he explains this plan at length in his Didactic Method and its appendix, published in German.
35.Parts I and II of his Method were published.
The first part of the Method practically contained an ordered deduction of words from primitives, a task in which he had already had others as partners. The second part, which we have just mentioned, contains the Organon, and has all words placed under those headings of concordances that we have described, according to their meanings.
36. The third never saw the light.
The third part, promised by him but never published, would have given us headings of concordances about subjects and predicates, joined and combined with one another. He himself says:
“In the third part notions will be combined, all parts of speech and headings of meanings will predicate of one another, so that you may know, through fifteen headings, the nature of all subjects, for example what things are hard, what light, what white, what sonorous, and so on; in what things bodies agree, in what they differ. Thus you will possess the whole of practical physics and all proper comparisons, from which all definitions and hypotheses of all the sciences flow.”
But the lack of this third part is now somehow supplied by the second, which, as we said, can be conveniently applied to these uses by a person of moderate talent.
37. Judgment on the same Becher.
That man had a versatile intellect, which spread itself into all things and grasped them with singular sharpness. Therefore the proposals he made in his Didactic Method deserve the consideration of learned men; many things are found there that would be of the highest use in literary matters. He would also have taught us more, if he had brought to light his Gnostic Method for sharpening reason and forming judgment, which he promised. But we will say more below about his Didactic Method. For now we speak only of his New Organon, insofar as it can serve to direct the intellect in apprehending, comparing, and inferring things.
We do not yet have anyone who has arranged all predicates in a more exact order; and it is certainly to be regretted that we were cheated by his death of that third part, which teaches the practical application of predicates to subjects. The other books, such as Jonson’s Polyhistor, Peisfelder’s apparatus, and all the nomenclators and Gates, do not give us this use; Becher carefully laid bare their deficiency in his Method. He also rightly criticized many things in Comenius’ Pictured World, although the use of the images themselves, which displeases him, should not be rejected altogether.
38. How a school of nature, art, and human actions should be established.
I have often wished that some public school of nature, art, and human actions might be established for the young.
39. What is meant by these schools.
By a school of nature I would mean a well-ordered system of natural bodies, where through living demonstration of bodies and through words they would cling more deeply to memory, and for that reason would be fixed in the understanding. For no mnemonic art is more effective than when learners come into contact with the present thing itself. By a school of art I understand all the instruments of craftsmen and artisans, which would all be preserved in certain definite containers and explained to boys in detail.
40. Becher’s Theater of Nature and Art.
Later I found that Becher had also fallen into the same thoughts. In his Didactic Method, part 2, near the end, he proposed an idea for a kind of Theater of Nature and Art; and in the epilogue to his appendix, among other things, he promised the establishment of such a theater. But those very large promises came to nothing, and such things cannot be accomplished at private expense.
41. Such a theater would be of great use if built at a prince’s expense.
This much, however, is certain: if some prince were to build such a theater, or if it were introduced into academies in the manner of public libraries, the greater gathering of students would easily repay the expense. It would bring immense benefits and relieve studious young people of many labors, troubles, and costs. It would also attract other, even uneducated, curious people; and through many additions such a theater could be enlarged, so that the whole universe of things, compacted into one house, could be displayed to spectators.
42. A practical mechanical method.
But in the mechanical arts it would perhaps be more useful to approach the craftsmen themselves. Since the nature of instruments is learned more correctly from use itself, the very act of applying them, the autopsy, will give more instruction. Becher also promised a Practical Mechanical Method, with whose help he wished to teach the practice of all crafts through ten mechanical axioms, and in a short time too, so that students would understand the crafts more accurately than the craftsmen themselves, and within a year would learn many mechanical arts at the same time. Yet nothing of this sort appeared. Becher criticized Comenius’ Pictured World with an eye to such a theater, though that book still has its own use despite the lack of this theater.
43. Theatrical exercises are not to be omitted in youth.
These schools of nature and art would serve the perfecting of the intellect in the sciences, and in apprehension and judgment. A school of human actions would supply aids for forming prudence, and it should be established through theatrical actions. For foolish and tasteless people keep the young away from these exercises, or remove the whole use of theater, familiar among more cultivated nations, from the commonwealth. As comedy in the commonwealth is a school for the people, so in school life a school of actions can be proposed to the young through theatrical performances. Examples of virtues proposed through representations of actions take much firmer hold on the mind; and the action itself draws the outlines of moral and civil characters in the minds of tender youth, so that later in conversation they will not be crude or seem carried off into some other world.
44. What should be thought of Comenius’ comic games.
In these matters a certain order can be observed, so that the things presented theoretically in the precepts of moral and civil philosophy may be set forth in the theater, made exemplary by actions taken from history. Comenius wanted the history of the philosophers to be impressed on his pupils in this way, and as a specimen he brought Diogenes the Cynic onto the stage. He likewise communicated his Gate in comic games, a plan that Becher rightly attacked. For in grasping things, simple and well-ordered teaching is required; comedy, since it is suited only to representing actions, can accomplish absolutely nothing by itself. Therefore prudent schoolmasters not only do not disapprove such theatrical exercises among school works, they even prescribe them.
45. Verulam’s judgment on theatrical action.
Verulam himself, a man of acknowledged authority and wisdom, when dealing with the art of pedagogy in On the Advancement of Learning, book 8, chapter 4, strongly recommends theatrical action.
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